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Abstract
In the theory of cooperative games so called dividends of a coalition S are
considered, which are defined as cS|S| . The costs cS form a c-diagram. On these
c-diagrams several types of shifts are defined and analysed. Different solu-
tion concepts and their properties are related to shifts. We introduce reward
games and fine games as components of a cooperative game. Some solution
concepts for applications are analysed in terms of c-diagrams, as well as the
solidarity concept.
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1 Introduction
Let N be a set of n players. From the theory of cooperative games, one knows that
the space of all characteristic functions v, corresponding to an n-person coalitional
game (N, v) is a linear vector space. Moreover, one of its bases is {uS, S ∈ 2N \ ∅},
where uS is the unanimity game for S, defined as
uS(T ) =
{
1, if S ⊂ T ,
0, otherwise.
Hence, for each cooperative game (N, v), the map v can be expressed as
v(S) =
∑
T⊆S
T =∅
c(uT ), (1)
where
c(uS) =
∑
T⊆S,T =∅
(−1)|S|−|T |vc(T ).
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Figure 1: v-diagram and c-diagram of a 3-player cooperative game
In the theory of cooperative games, the quantities c(uS), S ⊆ N are widely used.
Recall that one of the classical proofs for the characterisation of the Shapley value
by the efficiency, anonimity, dummy player and additivity properties is done by
using decomposition (1) (see [S53]). Also, note that the Shapley value associates
to each player i, xi =
∑
S⊆N
Si
1
|S|c(uS). In another context, c(uS) are used by Harsanyi
[Har59] to define the dividend of set S, which is c(uS|S| .
The quantities c(uS) also proved to be essential in establishing the connection
between set games and cooperative games (see [BH03]).
As we are essentially considering the partially ordered set of subsets of N , we
can make use of the Hasse diagram to indicate the values of the coalitions in the
cooperative game as well as the associated numbers c(uS), see Figure 1.
Remark 1 Note that we have written vS for vc(S), cS for c(uS) and that we have
added the number 0 in the c-diagram on the right. The diagram on the left is
called v-diagram. We will mainly discuss the c-diagram in this paper. Note that
the sum of the numbers cS equals v123. Restriction of the c-diagram to subsets of
a coalition S determines a sub-c-diagram with numbers that sum up to vS. For
example, c12 + c1 + c2 = v12.
In Section 2 the concept of shift is introduced and various shift techniques and their
corresponding solution concepts are discussed. In Section 3 we introduce reward
games and fine games. In Section 4 we analyse some applications of c-diagrams. In
Section 5 two new solidarity concepts are presented.
2 Solution concepts and game shifts
Any solution concept can be written as
xi =
∑
S⊆N
λS,icS. (2)
This simply expresses that every player i gets a certain share of each cS.
The positive cS can be interpreted as a cooperation bonus or reward in case
2
cS ≥ 0 or as a cooperation malus or fine in case it is negative. Then (2) can be seen
as distributing cooperation rewards and fines.
A pure egalitarian value, in which every player gets the same, namely v(N)
n
, is
obtained for λS,i =
1
n
, for each S and i. The Shapley value is obtained if λS,i =
1
|S|
for all i, i ∈ S, and λS,i = 0 otherwise. If for player 1 we have λS,i = 1 while λS,i = 0
for all i, i = 1, player 1 is allocated v(N) and the other players have allocation zero.
That value might be called the unfair value. Solution concepts may be therefore be
studied or classified by considering the possibilities for λS,i. A first distinction might
be made by distinguishing such solution concepts where the λS,i do not depend on
the function vc in (N, vc) from solution concepts where they do. Another distinction
might be between the situation where 0 ≤ λS,i ≤ 1 and the situation where λS,i may
be outside the interval [0, 1]. We are inclined to consider only solution concepts in
which λS,i is independent of vc and in the interval [0, 1].
So by changing λS,i we can obtain a different solution concept, a different value.
However, there is another way of looking at the c-diagram. Let the λS,i be fixed
and, more particularly, let us choose λS,i as the Shapley value, i.e.
1
|S| or zero.
We now consider the possibility to distribute the sumtotal of the cS’s over the
2n − 1 places of the diagram in another way. We say that such a re-distribution
leads to a a shifted c-diagram. The Shapley value now calculates the allocation with
cS’s that have changed. Naturally, a shift of the c-diagram will result in a shifted
v − diagram, and hence in a shifted game.
We are interested, among other, in ways of shifting the c-diagram such that the
solution, in our case the Shapley value, remains the same. For example, consider
the c∗-diagram in which c∗i = xi according to the Shapley value , applied to the
c-diagram of (N, v), and in which c∗S = 0, for all S with |S| ≥ 2. Applying the
Shapley value to this shifted c∗-diagram gives the same allocations xi as before, but
constructing the v∗-diagram corresponding to the c∗ diagram we find v∗(S) =
∑
i∈S
xi,
for all S ⊆ N , in general differing from v(S) in (N, v). So we have a game shift
although the solution stays the same.
Remark 2 One can prove that by applying the following shifting technique itera-
tively, the Shapley value remains unchanged, although the game is shifted.
Technique Either shift cS|S| to the cT with T ⊆ S and |T | = |S| − 1 or shift |S|
equal parts from these cT to cS.
The proof is straightforward and is based only on the definition of the Shapley
value.
Example 1 Consider the following 3-persons game and three shifts.
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v:




0
1 2 3








5 6 7




10
c:=⇒




0
1 2 3








2 2 2




−2
=⇒
shift 1




0
0 1 3








4 2 2




−2
=⇒
shift 2




0
0 0 2








4 2 4




−2
c:=⇒
shift 3




0
0 0 2 .








2 0 2




4
The v-diagram corresponding to the last c-diagram is




0
0 0 2 .








2 2 4




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From the last c-diagram we can calculate the Shapley value of the shifted game,
x1 =
2
2
+
4
3
= 2
1
3
x2 =
2
2
+
2
2
+
4
3
= 3
1
3
x3 = 2 +
2
2
+
4
3
= 4
1
3
,
which is equal to the Shapley value of the initial game. Hence, although the game
changed, the Shapley value remained the same.
It would be very interesting to completely characterize the shifting techniques
that preserve certain values. Clearly, as any solution φ is equal to the Shapley
value of the game vφ, defined as vφ({i}) = φ(i), i ∈ N and vφ(S) = 0, for each
S ⊆ N, |S| ≥ 2, any game shift of vφ that preserves the Shapley value would also
preserve φ. Of course, there are many other shifts that preserve solution concepts.
We will give an example for the egalitarian solution proposed by Dutta and
Ray [DR89]. Two principles are used: Maximization of average profit by coalition
members and equal sharing.
Example 2 Consider the same 3-player game as in Example 1. The v-diagram
and c-diagram are:
4
v :




0
1 2 3








5 6 7




10
c :




0
1 2 3 .








2 2 2




−2
We have seen that the Shapley value is
x1 = 2
1
3
, x2 = 3
1
3
, x3 = 4
1
3
.
The egalitarian solution concept determines the S with highest average. This is
in our case S = {2, 3}, with average 31
2
. Both players 2 and 3 get 31
2
and player 1
gets the rest, namely 10− 7 = 3. So x∗1 = 3, x∗2 = 312 , x∗3 = 312 .
We now shift the c-diagram as follows. c2 and c3 are shifted to c23 and c123,
c12 and c13 are shifted to c1. This yields a shift to the following c
∗-diagram with
corresponding v∗-diagram:
c∗ :




0
3 0 0








0 0 7




0
v∗ :




0
3 0 0 .








3 3 7




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We have a game shift vc 	→ v∗c and applying the Shapley value to the c∗-diagram
we obtain the allocation
x∗1 = 3 +
0
2
+
0
2
+
0
3
= 3
x∗2 = 0 +
0
2
+
7
2
− 0
3
= 3
1
2
x∗3 = 0 +
0
2
+
7
2
− 0
3
= 3
1
2
.
Note that we might also have shifted to maintain c∗∗2 = 2, c
∗∗
3 = 2 and c
∗∗
23 = 3.
The c123, c12, c13 should, however, be shifted to c1 as from them no contributions to
player 2 or player 3 should be coming. We would have the diagrams:
c∗∗ :




0
3 2 2








0 0 3




0
v∗∗ :




0
3 2 2 .








5 5 7




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5
We observe a c-diagram shift from c to c∗∗, with corresponding v-diagram shift,
or game shift, from v to v∗∗, but without solution shift.
In the example above we have seen that shifting techniques might be used in the
study of coalition formation. There is an essential difference between the situation in
which an allocation is calculated from the cooperation rewards and fines by a value
designed by a person from the outside, say a judge, and the situation in which the
players are considered to determine the allocation themselves by forming coalitions
on the basis of the cooperation rewards and fines. To give a very simple example
we recall the egalitarian method, where, in Example 2, players 2 and 3 formed a
coalition yielding them a share of 31
2
each, leaving 3 for player 1.
3 Reward games and fine games
In normal cooperative game theory margins play an important role. The quantity
mi(S, vc) = vc(S ∪ i)− vc(S)
gives the contribution of player i to the value of the coalition S, on joining that
coalition. Marginalistic values are solution concepts expressed in terms of margins.
As vc(S) can be expressed in the costs cT of the elements uT of the standard set
game < N, vs > associated with (N, vc), we can express margins in terms of the cT ’s.
As vc(S) =
∑
T⊆S
cT , we immediately have
mi(S, vc) =
∑
T⊆S
cT∪{i}
So the margin of player i with respect to the coalition S is the sum of all cooperation
rewards and fines of the subcoalitions of which player i is a member. For a 3-player
game we have e.g.
m3({1, 2}, vc) = vc({1, 2, 3})− vc({1, 2})
= c123 + c12 + c13 + c23 + c1 + c2 + c3 − c12 − c1 − c2
= c123 + c13 + c23 + c3.
A solution concept expressed in terms of the cS’s has a finer structure than the
same solution concept in terms of the margins. The c-diagram of the standard set
game allows an interesting remark on solution concepts, also due to the distinction of
cooperation rewards and fines. Before designing a solution concept we can separate
the c-diagram into two c-diagrams, one having the positive cS’s and zero on those
places in the diagram where the cS’s are negative and another having the negative
cS’s and zeroes on those places in the diagram where the cS’s are positive. As a
6
c-diagram determines a v-diagram, i.e. a game, we have split the game into two
games now. As we have separated the cooperation rewards from the cooperation
fines we call these two games the reward game and the fine game of the original
game.
Example 3 Let the c-diagram for a 3-player game ({1, 2, 3} , v) be
c :




0
1 2 3








0 −1 −2




2
, so v :




0
1 2 3








3 3 3




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The c-diagram splits into
cr :




0
1 2 3








0 0 0




2
and cf :




0
0 0 0








0 1 2 ,




0
where the minus signs have been omitted. The cr-diagram and cf -diagram define
two games, with vr-diagram and vf -diagram.
vr :




0
1 2 3








3 4 5




8
vf :




0
0 0 0 .








0 1 2




3
Note that in both games the cS’s are nonnegative. It is known that both games are
therefore convex and have non-empty core.
Designing a solution concept may be seen as deciding on how the cooperation
rewards and cooperation fines should be allocated. Let xr be a solution for the re-
ward game and let xf be a solution for the fine game. One can then allocate for the
original game x = xr − xf . Note that we did not say anything about the solution
concepts used. In fact for allocating the fines one may use another solution concept
than for the rewards. The fairest way to split a cooperation reward, for some coali-
tion, seems to split the reward into equal parts and allocate them to each of the
7
members of the coalition. This would mean using the Shapley value for the reward
game. In Example 3 we would get xr = (1
2
3
, 22
3
, 32
3
). A cooperation fine, for some
coalition, might be dealt with in the same way, and we would get xf = (
1
2
, 1, 11
2
), so
x = (11
6
, 12
3
, 21
6
), the Shapley value for the original game. However, as cf ({1, 3}) = 1
and cf ({2, 3}) = 2 are the only non-zero elements of the cf -diagram, one might ar-
gue that player 3 is to blame for causing fines, so that he should be allocated the
full fine of 3. We would then have xf = (0, 0, 3) and x = xr − xf = (123 , 223 , 23). If
this would be considered too hard a punishment for the non-cooperation of player
3, an alternative solution concept for the fine game would be to count the number
of times a player is part of a coalition with cooperation fine. In Example 3 this
would give 1, 1, and 2 as weights that are to be used in distributing the cooperation
fines. Then cf ({1, 3}) = 1 would be split into 13 for player 1 and 23 for player 3 and
cf({2, 3}) = 2 would be split into 23 for player 2 and 43 for player 3. This would yield
xf = (
1
3
, 2
3
, 2) and thus x = (12
3
, 22
3
, 32
3
)− (1
3
, 2
3
, 2) = (11
3
, 2, 12
3
). As in this way the
player who is involved most times in a cooperation fine is fined most, we consider
this a fair procedure for allocating the fines. We summarize our considerations in
the following solution method, which we call the Reward and Fine Method.
1. Consider a cooperative game (N, v).
2. Construct the c-diagram for its associated standard set game
3. Split the c-diagram into a reward diagram and and a fine digram
4. Consider the reward game (N, vr) corresponding to the cr-diagram and deter-
mine the Shapley solution xr.
5. Consider the fine diagram and determine the vector w, with components wi,
giving the number of times player i is member of a coalition with a cooperation fine.
6. Split a cooperation fine cS into parts proportional to the components wi cor-
responding to the players that belong to S. Determine the allocation vector xf of
the fine game (N, vf) by summing these parts for all n players.
7. Calculate x = xr − xf .
There are many solution concepts proposed in the literature of cooperative
games. For games modeling a situation in which some gain is to be allocated to
players, the proposed method seems fair, in particular the use of the Shapley value
for the reward game. For the fine game easily other splittings of the cooperation
fines might be proposed, that seem fair too. For a game in which a cost is to be
shared the c-diagram can be split into two diagrams again, but the interpretation
is then changing the picture. The positive cS’s are now costs, resulting from joint
activities, whereas the negative cS’s can be seen as savings on the costs, due to coop-
eration. One is inclined to speak about a Cost and Saving method and to exchange
the ways the two games, the cost game and the saving game are given a solution.
Now the Shapley value seems fair for the saving game, whereas the method used for
the fine game might be chosen for the cost game. After all, rewards and savings are
typically cooperation bonuses, whereas fines and costs are cooperation maluses.
8
4 Analysis of some solution concepts for applica-
tions
In this section we include only a few of the many problems considered in the litera-
ture on cooperative game theory.
4.1 Bankruptcy problems
Bankruptcy problems belong to the oldest problems considered, see Moulin [M01],
as already 2000 years ago in the Babylonian Talmud rules were given, solution con-
cepts, how to allocate a given total T to two claimants with demands d1 and d2,
d1 ≤ d2, the so called Contested Garment problem. Let us consider this problem
against the background of c-diagrams.
The value of v(S) has to be defined. One way to do this is to simply take v({1})
and v({2}) as mind1, T and mind2, T and to take v({1, 2}) = T as their joint claim.
We then have the following v-diagram and c-diagram:
min{d1 + d2, T}
0
v : min{d2, T}min{d1, T}








cv :
0
T −min{d1, T} −min{d2, T}
min{d1, T} min{d2, T} .








Now let us define w(S) in another way, namely w(S) = (T − dN\S)+, where dS
is the sum of the claims of the players of S and (a)+ = max{a, 0}. We obtain the
following diagrams:
w
T
0
(T − d2)+(T − d1)+








cw :
0
T − (T − d1)+ − (T − d2)+
(T − d2)+ (T − d1)+ .








Denote by D = T − min{d1, T} − min{d2, T}. Applying the reward and fine
method to the game v, we obtain
xr = (min{d1, T}+ max{D
2
, 0},min{d2, T}+ max{D
2
, 0})
xf = (min{D
2
, 0},min{D
2
, 0}).
9
. Hence, x = (min{d1, T}+ D2 ,min{d2, T}+ D2 ).
Now, applying the reward and fine method to w, we obtain:
xr = ((T − d2)+ + max{D¯
2
, 0}, (T − d1)+ + max{D¯
2
, 0})
xf = (min{D¯
2
, 0},min{D¯
2
, 0}),
where D¯ = T − (T − d1)+ − (T − d2)+). We obtain the allocation x = ((T −
d2)+
D¯
2
, (T − d1)+ D¯2 ).
Note that in both cases we have obtained the, same, Contested Garment solution
(see [M01]).
4.2 Minimum cost spanning tree problems
A well known type of cooperative game was introduced by Bird [B76], see also Aarts
[A94]. Some source is supplying some facilities, say gas, to n players, say houses, by
a network of transportation means, say gas pipes. Given are the costs for connecting
the players to the source between each other. We can describe the situation by a
complete graph on n+1 vertices, with edges carrying labels representing these costs.
A minimum cost spanning tree is constructed. The problem is to allocate the cost
of the constructed network to the players.
The modeling as a game, a so called mcst-game, is by defining the worth of a
coalition S as the cost of the minimum cost spanning subtree of the graph on the
vertices of S and the source. We will number the source by 0 and the n players by
1, ..., n.
We will again choose a very simple example, with n = 3, to discuss the way set
game theory ideas can be used to deal with this problem.
The graph is chosen to be
2 3
1
0
3
2 6
1
5 7
.
10
The labels represent the costs of the edges. The minimum cost spanning trees
and subtrees are easily calculated. We find
v(∅) = 0 v({1, 2}) = 3
v({1}) = 1 v({1, 3}) = 7
v({2}) = 5 v({2, 3}) = 8
v({3}) = 7 v({1, 2, 3}) = 6
Let us first consider the v-diagram and the c-diagram:
The Shapley value gives x = (−2
3
, 15
6
, 45
6
). It turns out that player 1, closest to
v :




0
1 5 7








3 7 5




6
c :




0
1 5 7 .








−3 −1 −4




1
the source 0, even gets paid. The reason can be said to be that this house is used
as transit point for the other players.
One might, however, argue that, once the network is constructed, having in this
case the form of a path,from 0 to 1 to 2 to 3, the egalitarian method of Dutta and
Ray may be applied. This solution gives x = (1, 21
2
, 21
2
).
Yet another solution can be obtained on applying the idea of reward game and
fine game. We make the distinction between elements that are IN the minimum
cost spanning tree and elements that are OUTside. We can then split the v-diagram
into two diagrams, vIN -diagram and vOUT -diagram, where the first describes the
elements for which costs are actually made, and the second describes elements for
which costs are avoided. The vIN -diagram, vOUT -diagram and the corresponding
c-diagrams are:




0
vIN :
1 0 0








3 1 3




6
vOUT :




0
0 5 7








0 6 5




0




0
cIN :
1 0 0








2 0 3




0
cOUT :




0
0 5 7 .








−5 −1 −7




1
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We now can deal with the two game settings separately. The Shapley value gives
xIN = (2, 2
1
2
, 11
2
), the solution we met before, and xOUT = (−223 ,−23 , 313), so that
x = xIN + xOUT = (−23 , 156 , 456) is regained. However, we might argue that there
are avoided costs involved, profits that should be taken into account. They occur
for the coalitions {2}, {3}, {1, 3} and {2, 3}. The profit frequencies are given by
w = (1, 2, 3). Using this weight vector for the cOUT -diagram we obtain
xOUT = (−13
4
,−4
5
,
51
20
)
and combining this outcome with xIN , formed by the Shapley value from the cIN -
diagram, we obtain
x = (
1
4
, 1
7
10
, 4
1
20
).
This is the reward and fine solution for the mcst-game.
5 A class of solidarity values
Next we will analyse some solidarity values from the perspective of c-diagrams.
Nowak and Radzik [NR94] consider the marginal contribution
mi(S) = v(S)− v(S − {i})
as it occurs in the Shapley value and replace it by
Av(S) =
1
|S|
∑
j∈S
mj(S),
so by the average contribution for the players belonging to the coalition S. This way
players with a high marginal contribution share it to some extent with the players
with a low marginal contribution. For this reason
fi =
∑
Si
(n− |S|)!(|S| − 1)!
n!
Av(S)
is called a solidarity value.
We will consider the idea of sharing contributions in the context of c-diagrams
and shifting of c-diagrams. We start with a simple two player example. Let the
v-diagram and the c-diagram of the two-player game be
v :
10
0
28








c :
0
0
8 2 .








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The Shapley value fi =
∑
Si
1
|S|c(S) gives the allocation a = (8, 2). We introduce
a variable σ, for solidarity, describing what is shifted from c({1}) to c({2}) and from
c({2}) to c({1}) in the following way. The cSOL-diagram becomes:
0
0
1
2
σ8 + (1− 1
2
σ)2 (1− 1
2
σ)8 + 1
2
σ2 .








So a fraction of the c’s is given to the other player. If 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1, then at most
half of the c-contribution is given to the other player. fi(σ) =
∑
Si
1
|S|c
SOL(S), with
cSOL({1}) = 8− 3σ and cSOL({2}) = 2+3σ, gives an allocation a = (8− 3σ, 2+3σ)
for the simple example. Note that for σ = 0 no solidarity is involved and that for
σ = 1 we obtain complete solidarity as then, calculating the Shapley value applied
to the shifted cSOL-diagram, a = (5, 5). In fact, we have an infinite class of solidarity
values.
We now generalize this procedure as follows. Given a c-diagram, we consider
all coalitions with the same cardinality and let these coalitions share the same part
of their cS with the other
(
n
|S|
)
− 1 coalitions. Note that this differs from the
procedure chosen by Novak and Radzik. We define
cSOLS (σ) =

1−
(
n
|S|
)
− 1(
n
|S|
) σ

 cS +
(
n
|S|
)
− 1(
n
|S|
) σ

 1( n
|S|
)
− 1
∑
S∗ =S
|S∗|=|S|
cS∗

 .
The class of values is given by
fi(σ) =
∑
Si
1
|S|c
SOL
S (σ), 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1.
So we consider the Shapley value for the cSOL-diagram. For σ = 0 we regain the
Shapley value, whereas for σ = 1 we obtain
cSOLS (1) =
1(
n
|S|
)cS + 1(
n
|S|
) ∑
S∗ =S
|S∗|=|S|
cS∗ =
1(
n
|S|
) ∑
|T |=|S|
cT .
So, for σ = 1 layer-wise the values of the cS’s are equal and therefore the Shapley
value is the same for all players and we have complete solidarity. The c-diagram
makes the sharing process quite transparent.
In order to discuss the concept of solidarity value somewhat further, against the
background of c-diagrams, we consider the axiomatization of values. Let F be a
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value which satisfies the additivity axiom (ADD), the efficiency axiom (EFF) and
the equal treatment property (ETP). Consider the decomposition of a cooperative
game into unanimity games. The additivity axiom leads to the consideration of one
the c′Ss separately for each subset S. The efficiency axiom forces F to distribute cS
completely over the players. The equal treatment property leads to breaking up cS
into s = |S| equal parts, if no part of cS is distributed over the players outside S.
If we only have the axioms ADD, EFF and ETP, we are left with the decision of
breaking up the dividend/cost cS.
Let us now look how such a decision is taken. The dummy player property can be
expressed as ”no dummy players should get a part of cS”. This leads to the Shapley
value. However, in the context of solidarity values, we might also say ”no part of cS
is to be allocated to any player outside S”. Let us now look at the solidarity value
of Nowak and Radzik. Replacing the marginal contribution mi(S) by the average
contribution Av(S), is a rather complicated transformation in terms of costs. In
terms of cS’s we have
mi(S) =
∑
T⊆S
Ti
cT is replaced by A
v(S) =
1
|S|
∑
j∈S
∑
T⊆S
Tj
cT .
For the characterization of their value, Novak and Radzik had to replace the dummy
player axiom by the socalled A-dummy player axiom, thus allowing that a normal
normal dummy player can have a share in the marginal contributions of other players
of a coalition. Only when the Av(S)’s are zero for those S to which a player belongs,
the player should have allocation zero. However, the sharing procedure is restricted
to the members of S, and many more sharing procedures are thinkable.
At this point, the whole axiomatization is put in a different light. ADD, EFF
and ETP are axioms that reduce the design of a value to the choice of a sharing rule
for cS. Any sharing rule determines the value, i.e. determines the λS,i in the general
expression of a solution. Instead of formulating some extra axiom and proving that
now some new value has been uniquely determined, one might focus on sharing
rules added to the axioms mentioned. In particular for solidarity values this seems
a natural approach.
Of the many possibilities to define a solidarity value, let us consider the following
sharing rule. Part of cS is distributed over the n − |S| players outside S, ”out of
solidarity”. The completely solidary way would be to distribute cS equally over all n
players. Then |S|
n
cS is going to the members of S and
n−|S|
n
cS is going to the players
outside S. Note that we have taken into account axiom ETP.
A player not in S might receive σ cS
n
, 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1, leaving cs − σ (n−|S|)n cS for the
members of S, who get allocated 1|S|
(
1− σ (n−|S|)
n
)
cS each. The allocation to player
i now becomes
fi(σ) =
∑
Si
1
|S|
(
1− σ (n− |S|)
n
)
cS +
∑
Sni/∈S
σ
n
cS, 0 ≤ σ ≤ 1,
which is a class of rather natural allocations, maybe preferable to the one given
before. For each player something drops off the costs cS of coalition S to which he
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does not belong. Again for σ = 0 we regain the Shapley value and for σ = 1 we
have fi(1) =
1
n
v(N), the completely solidary allocation.
We conclude with an example of Novak and Radzik, called ”the three brothers”.
The v-diagram and c-diagram are




0
v :
0 0 0








1 0 0




1




0
c :
0 0 0








1 0 0
.




1
The Shapley value gives f = (1
2
, 1
2
, 0), so the helpless brother, player 3, gets
nothing. The solidarity value of Novak and Radzik gives f = ( 7
18
, 7
18
, 4
18
), and brother
3 is allocated 4
18
out of solidarity. Our second class of solidarity values gives f(σ) =
(1
2
(1 − σ
3
), 1
2
(1 − σ
3
), σ
3
). Indeed, we have f(0) = (1
2
, 1
2
, 0) and f(1) = (1
3
, 1
3
, 1
3
). The
Novak and Radzik value shows solidarity σ = 2
3
.
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